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   The European Union’s suite of Erasmus programs are an ambitious effort to facilitate 
educational mobility and research across the EU’s 28 member countries and with partners around 
the world. It is one of the primary means to achieve a sense of European identity among the 
citizens across the Union, and governmental and educational organizations in the U.S. are keen 
to learn more about how they can also engage with it. The Departments of State and Education, 
because of their respective work in international education, are particularly well-positioned to 
lead that effort. Erasmus is ambitious in its social objectives and level of funding, and stake-
holders in the U.S. including at Higher Education Institutions have heard about its programs but 
generally assume they’re only for Europeans and their institutions. That is not the case. Programs 
jointly supported by the U.S. government (USG) and EU have been implemented including the 
discontinued Atlantis program and ongoing Fulbright-EU Schuman program, and there are 
additional avenues for stakeholders in the U.S. to engage with Erasmus such as its International 
Credit Mobility program among others. The EU Delegation to the United States and other 
official representatives are charged to conduct outreach about those opportunities to a diverse 
US. audience. An inventory of the EU and U.S.’s respective international education programs 
should be conducted to identify venues for collaboration, better understand previous and ongoing 
collaborations (and lessons learned from those efforts), and the state of the programs in domestic 
and global contexts. The close geopolitical relationship and shared educational traditions 
between the U.S. and EU (and its member-nations) provide the most fertile soil for international 
education collaboration in the world, and light of the upcoming 2021 renewal of the Erasmus 
programs and the increasingly dynamic global educational environment now is the opportune 



























Erasmus’ Role in Building a New Europe 
The origins of the European Union (EU) is a well-known story, one born from the ashes 
of the world wars that occurred during the first half of the 20th century. By 1945 much of Europe 
had been laid to waste and the United States and the Soviet Union assumed their respective 
positions of dominance that would last for the next 45 years. This period was a historical turning 
point of staggering implications, especially considering the positions of power that European 
nations had held for the previous several centuries. The exhausted community of European 
nations, now squeezed between the two great powers, had to come to grips with their new status 
on the world stage and how they’d relate to one another. These circumstances forced Europeans 
to look inward and craft a new way of coexistence which gradually coalesced in the form of the 
European Union. 
The governmental structures that eventually grew to become the European Union were 
initially established to rebuild from the destruction of World War II. The European Coal and 
Steel Community, established in 1952, created a common market for coal and steel and is 
commonly regarded as the first step towards the establishment of the EU. The original signatory 
countries were: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, West Germany, and the Netherlands (The 
history of the European Union, 2019). Eastern European countries were of course prevented 
from joining during this time, but Western Europe continued its course towards tighter 
integration and gradually turned its attention towards social issues as living conditions improved. 
These included educational standardization across borders and the mobility of students and 
researchers. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years 
later brought Central and Eastern European countries into the Union in quick succession. This 




was accompanied by the eastward expansion of NATO to include nations that had formally been 
in the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. 
Reflecting on the growth of the European Union experiment, Monica Sassatelli argued 
that in order to legitimize its authority the EU had to formalize “the realization that the idea of 
‘Europe’ as the foundation of an identity” (Sassatelli, 2002, p. 435). To accomplish that 
audacious goal the EU, through its administrative units, had to tackle both pragmatic bricks-and-
mortar concerns (like infrastructure), and broader social issues including identity to prevent yet 
another rise of nationalism and xenophobia in the region. But how would that be achieved, to 
reshape the identity of hundreds of millions of Europeans who came from a myriad of distinct, 
ancient traditions? Was it realistic or ethical to want citizens to identify themselves as Europeans 
primarily instead of their respective national or regional identity? Could that effort lead to 
unforeseen negative consequences, such as xenophobia and nationalism?  
Embracing European identity, Sassatelli (2002) continued, wouldn’t be achieved by 
“legal and economic integration alone.” And, cultural matters and integration require actions 
such as the “sponsorship and subsidy campaigns, exchange programmes, along with the 
regulation of the cultural good market” (p. 436). These sentiments gained support by public 
policy makers in Brussels and consequently the Erasmus programs, the “European Capitals of 
Culture” and other initiatives were launched. As sophisticated consumers and defenders of 
cultural identity, however, decision-makers across the region knew that Europeans would reject 
attempts to regulate or homogenize identity so it was decided that the way forward was to 
support programs that provide opportunities to explore and celebrate traditions which would 
hopefully help achieve greater understanding, tolerance and social stability.  




“Culture needs to be standardized and universalized to keep up with the increasingly 
complexity and global scale of the social structure”, Sassatelli (2002) argued, “as it once was for 
the nationstate” (p. 438). That endorsement of cultural standardization is noteworthy and while 
not a stated objective of the European Commission (the executive arm of the EU), its mere 
mention causes alarm to many Europeans and may have contributed to recent expressions of 
nationalism such as the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the rise of populist 
governments in Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy and other EU member nations. Anticipating this 
Sassatelli continued by recommending that “the EU has to deal with another sensitive issue, that 
of fostering the common European heritage without provoking the reaction of national or local 
cultures (that is, of the much older respective institutions)” (p. 440). This awareness, to provide a 
space for local cultures to chart their own development while working towards regional cohesion 
and a European identity, is a delicate prime directive that must be followed to ensure the Union’s 
survival. Educational traditions are certainly integral aspects of cultural identity so to make this 
work they be respected and allowed to continue and develop in different ways. In order to foster 
regional economic growth and ease learner and worker mobility, however, some standardization 
across the higher education sector in the form of credentialing and other actions must be 
implemented. It is within this narrow territory that the Erasmus programs carefully navigate.   
Educational System Standardization to Advance Collaboration and Mobility 
If the Erasmus programs are the fuel to propel European student and educator mobility 
then the Bologna Declaration, signed in 1999 by ministers from 29 European countries, is the 
engine that the petrol is used in. Bologna established a suite of processes including credentialing 
articulation and transferal which have continued to increase since its inception and now, like 
Erasmus, has expanded into Eastern European countries that were formally part of the Warsaw 




Pact and Soviet Union (including some in Central Asia). As reported in “The European Higher 
Education Area in 2018: Bologna Process Implementation Report” (2018) the number of 
participating countries has grown to 48 with Belarus joining in 2015. That number is noteworthy 
for several reasons including there are only 28 nations in the EU so it has a wider more 
“Eurasian” scope of engagement. This level of participation begs the question why almost one 
quarter of all countries globally would voluntarily opt-in to follow Bologna’s rules, regulations 
and reporting requirements? While every country has its own reasons, those that are 
geographically contiguous or close to Europe most likely did so, in part, to connect with its 
vibrant educational systems and the corresponding funding opportunities that come with that 
association.         
As mentioned, the most commonly known feature of Bologna is that it provides 
structures to achieve greater standardization of higher education systems by establishing means 
to confer credit and credentialing recognition. That is: 
Like the degree structure it should cater for comparable and transferable qualifications 
and facilitate mobility and recognition irrespective where and how learning outcomes 
have been achieved. European and national qualifications frameworks are based on the 
European Credit Transfer and Accumulations System (ECTS) in terms of quality 
(learning outcomes) and quantity (workload). (Three-cycle system, 2019, para. 3) 
The transferability of qualifications was part of the Bologna Process’ original intent but over the 
years its grown to incorporate a variety of other functions. Specifically, according to “The 
European Higher Education Area in 2018: Bologna Process Implementation Report” there are “7 
key policy areas” that had been identified at the Yerevan Conference in 2015: The European 
Higher Education Area Landscape; Learning and Teaching, Degrees and Qualifications; Quality 




Assurance and Recognition; Opening Higher Education to a Diverse Student Population; 
Relevance of the Outcomes and Employability; and Internationalisation and Mobility (The 
European Higher Education Area in 2018: Bologna Process Implementation Report, 2018, p. 5). 
Each of those areas have their respective sub topics that are reviewed periodically – 
usually every two to three years, and articulated in communiques named after the cities where 
the working group met that year (e.g. Rome 2010). Section 5.1.1.2. of the 2018 Implementation 
Report addresses “Gender balance”, for example, and has a wide-range of information about that 
topic including the “Percentage of women among new entrants in tertiary education in 2004/05 
and 2014/15” (p. 160). Although the United States is not a full participant like the 
aforementioned 48 countries, but being familiar with Bologna’s processes and priorities (like 
gender balance) is helpful for international education professionals who do things like document 
preparation and review for students studying between the U.S. and EU to ensure, among other 
things, credit transferability. 
Bologna uses technical definitions that international education professionals need to 
understand. “First-cycle programmes”, for example, refer to bachelor degrees or equivalent, 
“second-cycle” master’s or equivalent and “third-cycle” Ph.D. or equivalent. Specifically: 
The first cycle leads to a qualification (in many countries labelled “Bachelor”) which is 
obtained after successful completion of a study programme with 180 – 240 [European 
Credit Transfer and Accumulation System] ECTS credits. Programmes of the first cycle 
last typically three years. (Ministerial Conference Bologna 1999, 1999, para. 3)  
And: 
The second cycle leads to a qualification (in many countries labelled “Master”) which is 
obtained after successful completion of a study programme with 60 – 120 ECTS credits. 




These ranges for undergraduate and graduate programmes have been defined with the 
development of the Framework of Qualifications for the European Higher Education 
Area. (Ministerial Conference Bologna 1999, 1999, para. 3) 
Doctoral programmes were added as the third cycle at the 2003 conference in Berlin (the Berlin 
Communique). In addition to setting policy and definitions, Bologna tracks a range of education-
related data such as per student expenditure on higher education, rates of participation in tertiary 
education and graduation. This is not dissimilar to the work of the U.S. Department of Education 
that tracks and reports similar information in its “Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System” (IPEDS). 
National educational systems have distinct cultures and traditions composed of 
curriculum, course naming and numbering protocol, how performance is measured (grading), 
and other features. To make sense of those differences a “diploma supplement” was developed as 
part of the Bologna Process and provides a framework to describe coursework to facilitate the 
recognition of qualifications across those national systems (diplomas, degrees, certificates, etc.). 
Among other things it explains a course’s level, content, and format of the respective academic 
program it’s a part of. It is intended to be free from any value judgements such as assessments of 
rigor or instructional quality. There are different templates used for diploma supplements, but 
information categories generally remain the same. One example is from Bournemouth University 
in the United Kingdom and the supplement it uses organizes information in the following general 
and sub categories: (1) Information identifying the holder of the qualification (name, DoB, etc.); 
(2) Information identifying the qualification (qualification name – Bachelor of Science, etc.); (3) 
Information on the level of the qualification (official length of programme, etc.); (4) Information 
on the contents and results gained (programme requirements, etc.); (5) Information on the 




function of the qualification (access to further study, etc.); and (6) Additional information 
(Bournemouth University Diploma Supplement, 2008). The diploma supplement is a component 
of a larger package of supporting documents, known collectively as “Europass”. The other 
documents in Europass include: A curriclum vitae in a standardized format, a “language 
passport” which is a self-assessment tool for language proficiency, and a record of the 
knowledge and skills acquired in another country known as “Europass Mobility” (Connect with 
Europass, n.d.). The idea is that collectively those items provide a holistic snapshot of the 
individual’s educational credentials and technical training for academic and professional 
placement among other uses.  
In order for Bologna’s ambitious mandate to work - to provide a framework for the 
educational coordination of more than forty countries – it must be coupled with a powerful 
propellent to achieve learner, educator and administrator mobility at a meaningful scale. This is 
largely achieved by Erasmus. Before diving into Erasmus, however, it should be mentioned that 
there are other programs offered by various organizations that also contribute to the overall goal 
of educational coordination and mobility. The components of the aforementioned Europass, for 
example, feed into other bodies that provide information for credentialing interpretation on a 
global level such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and European Network of Information Centres in European Region – National 
Academic Recognition Information Centres in the European Union (ENIC-NARIC) which 
promotes itself as a “gateway to recognition of academic and professional qualifications” (ENIC, 
n.d.).  More specifically, ENIC-NARIC is: 
…a joint initiative of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO, 
has been created primarily as a tool to assist the ENIC-NARIC Networks in carrying out 




the tasks they have been mandated to accomplish within their own jurisdiction, by 
directing them to up-to-date information supplied and maintained by the competent 
bodies in each member country and by each member organisation. It is also its express 
purpose to help other interested organisations and individuals easily find information on 
current issues in international academic and professional mobility, and on procedures for 
the recognition of foreign qualifications. (ENIC, n.d., para. 1) 
Clicking on one of the country links provides a glimpse of the breadth and depth of the resources 
provided. Information about the U.S., for example, is divided into eleven categories including: 
“National Information Centres” (where information about educational systems can be found), 
“System of education”, “Quality Assurance in Higher Education”, “Recognised higher education 
institutions”, “Recognition of Qualifications held by Refugees”, and other topics.  
There are only several countries outside the European region that contribute to the ENIC-
NARIC including the U.S., Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan and New Zealand. A probable reason 
why those countries chose to participate is because of the rate of mobility between them and 
Europe. The U.S., for example, receives more than 90,000 European students at its institutions of 
higher education each year and half of all its university students who study abroad do so in 
Europe - approximately 150,000 in 2018 (Institute for International Education, 2018). 
Participation in ENIC-NARIC helps achieve a more efficient credit and credentialing transfer 
process, and a Program Specialist from the U.S. Department of Education’ international affairs 
office serves as the U.S.’s representative to the network. While ENIC-NARIC is not an Erasmus 
Program it is an example of how the U.S. participates in a European-led higher education 
initiative, and speaks to the need for coordination related to education between nations and 
supranational entities like the EU.  




Erasmus Programs and How U.S. Stakeholders Can Participate in Them 
“Erasmus+”, which started in 2014 and will last until 2020, is the title of the current 
iteration of the Erasmus suite of programs which started in 1981. The next cycle, slated to start in 
2021 and run until 2027, is currently under development and according to the European 
Commission (EU Budget, 2018) may have its budget roughly doubled to thirty billion Euros. If 
that happens, the number of individuals who participate in its programs each year will 
significantly increase as will other outcomes such as the number of dual and joint degree 
offerings and collaborative research projects. It is also likely that the support to citizens and 
institutions of non (EU) member countries will also increase.                                                                                         
Erasmus places the U.S. in the “partner country” and “other industrialized countries” 
categories (Who can take part? n.d.). It joins 11 other nations in those classifications such as 
Australia and Canada. It’s important to note that while similar, Erasmus+ Partner Countries are 
not the same as the non-European countries that participate in the aforementioned ENIC-NARIC 
- they are separate initiatives with their own classification conventions. There are several 
Erasmus programs that entities from partner countries can participate in, and in the U.S. the EU 
Mission to the U.S. (the EU Embassy in Washington, D.C.) disseminates information about those 
opportunities.  
The first is the International Credit Mobility (ICM) program which in terms of pure 
numbers supports more mobility than any other Erasmus Program by far (tens of thousands 
student per year within and outside of Europe). That program, which generally provides support 
for shorter-term non degree bearing educational experiences, classifies the U.S. and Canada 
together in the “ICM regional budget” and from 2015-2017 65% of that budget was applied to 
the U.S. and 35% to Canada (European Commission, 2018).  





2015, 2016, and 2017 ICM mobility rates between the EU and U.S. 
Mobility Direction 2017 2016 2015 
Students and staff to Europe 586 494 466 
Students and staff to USA 494 468 418 
 
The chart above shows mobility growth in both direction – a 26% increase of U.S. students and 
staff to Europe between 2015 and 2017 and an 18% increase of European students and staff to 
the U.S. during the same period - which demonstrates a willingness by the Commission to 
provide increased funding to achieve more mobility between the EU and U.S. In order for 
students in the U.S. to receive support from ICM their U.S. Higher Education Institution (HEI) 
must work with an institution in an EU member nation. Specifically, that European institution is 
considered the “lead” applicant, and the U.S. institution’s information is captured in an “inter 
institutional agreement”. In other words, the onramp for U.S. participation in the ICM program is 
via a European institutional partner as a subgrantee. 
The International Credit Mobility (ICM) program includes a “Handbook for Participating 
Organizations”, a recent version of which was published in 2017 (European Commission, 2017). 
That handbook covers a range of topics from per diem rates and travel allowances, and provides 
guidance like:  
“Participating Partner Country HEIs must be recognized as higher education institutions 
(HEI) by the relevant authority in the Partner Country. They must sign an inter-
institutional agreement with their partner in the Programme Country before any mobility 
can take place.” (European Commission, 2017, p. 7) 
This means that the primary applicant must be the HEI in a “programme” (EU) country, and it 
must facilitate the signing of an inter-institutional agreement with the accredited HEI in the U.S. 
This process also demonstrates the interoperability and importance of tools like ENIC-NARIC 




which EU HEI lead applicants can refer to for resources about U.S. higher education 
accreditation and other topics.  
In regard to tips for the lead EU HEI applicant to find an appropriate co applicant in a 
“non program country” like the U.S., it is recommended that the lead institutional applicant 
“look at current or past cooperation agreements your institution might have, either at the level of 
the institution (typically via the international relations office), or at the level of individual 
faculties” (European Commission, 2017, p. 12). After an eligible U.S. partner institution for 
collaboration on the ICM program is identified, a “supplemental application” from the lead EU 
institution must be submitted (p. 15 – 18). That supplemental application consists of four 
sections each with its own evaluation point allocation: (1) Relevance of the strategy (30 points); 
(2) Quality of the cooperation arrangements (30 points); (3) Quality of the project design and 
implementation (20 points); and (4) Impact and dissemination (20 points). The Handbook 
provides definitions for those categories and “do and don’ts” tips. The application itself is done 
through the Erasmus+ Application portal and a “Participant Identification Code”, or PIC, for 
each organization is required to start an application. 
The primary document that U.S. HEIs would be responsible to complete for the 
supplemental application is the “Inter-institutional agreement”. It consists of 8 sections: (1) 
general information about the institutions; (2) mobility numbers per academic year (between the 
institutions); (3) recommended language skills (language of instruction at the respective 
institution); (4) respect of fundamental principles and other mobility requirements (per the 
principles articulate in the Erasmus Charter for Higher Education); (5) additional requirements, 
e.g. the selection criteria for students and staff; (6) calendar (for the institutions’ academic 
calendars); (7) “information” which consists of several sub categories: grading systems, visa 




requirements, insurance, housing; (8) signatures of the institutions. (EU login, n.d.) Once that 
information is inputted the application is submitted from the institution in the (EU) partner 
country to the ministry or agency that manages the Erasmus programs in the respective country, 
which can be a Ministry of Education or another entity with delegated authority. It is then routed 
to the overall (EU-wide) funding competition for the program, such as ICM, which in turn has 
funding limitations that can be applied to programming in non-member countries like the United 
States. Before concluding this discussion of ICM, it’s important to note that according to a report 
from the Commission: 
The budget for Canada and the United States makes up almost 5% of the entire 
international mobility budget and so far has funded 524 projects for bilateral partnerships 
that organize mobility for almost 4,400 students, researchers, and staff. (European 
Commission, 2018, p. 1) 
This budget allocation is not insignificant considering the primary intent of ICM – to facilitate 
mobility of Europeans within Europe. 
The next Erasmus program that allows participation by U.S. students is the “Erasmus 
Mundus Joint Master Degrees” (EMJMD) program which “awards EU-funded scholarships to 
Master students from around the world that cover tuition, travel, and a living allowance.” 
(Scholarships and costs, n.d.) Additionally, institutions from partner countries, such as the U.S. 
“can also be part of the consortia that deliver these programmes (though this is not obligatory) as 
Full Partners, which means they officially award degree, or as Associated Partners, where they 
participate in the program in some kind of capacity but not award the actual joint degree” 
(European Commission, 2018, p. 1). The break-down of the number of scholarships award 2014-
2017, during which there were 5,589, is as follows: “programme” countries (870), Canada (96), 




U.S. (196), and “rest of the world” (4,427) (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). U.S. student 
participation in the program, therefore, represented 3.5% of the total during this period. During 
this same period the number of proposals received that included U.S. institutions increased from 
12 in 2014 to 30 in 2017, and the number of awards that involve the U.S. increased from 1 in 
2014 to 12 in 2017 (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). Similar to the ICM program, a lead 
European institutional partner is necessary for a U.S. institution to work with to submit to 
participate in EMJMD.  
The last program to highlight is the “Jean Monnet Activities” which has the aim “to 
develop EU studies worldwide” by supporting a variety of initiatives including modules, chairs, 
and centres of excellence (EACEA - European Commission, 2019). This program’s allowable 
activities are actually quite similar to the U.S. Department of Education’s National Resource 
Centers which support what’s generally regarded as “area studies” programs. Some of the 
allowable activities in this program provide significantly more support than others, such as 
funding a “chair” faculty position compared to smaller ones for curriculum development. U.S. 
engagement in this program is quite small; in the 2017 competition, for example, 1,177 proposals 
were received and 238 were selected (European Commission, 2018, p. 2). Of those seventeen 
were from the U.S. and only three were funded. Unlike the EMJMD and ICM programs U.S. 
institutions and faculty can apply for participation in this program autonomously (not necessarily 
in collaboration with a European lead institutional partner).  
Disseminating Erasmus Information to American and other Audiences 
The Delegation of the European Union to the United States is charged to conduct public 
diplomacy across the country. To that end, a webinar about the Erasmus+ program was 
conducted by the Delegation in November 2018 (Slideshare.net, 2019) and provided information 




about opportunities for Americans including the ICM and others. Tips mentioned during the 
presentation included having the attendee contact their respective institution’s international 
programs office to investigate agreements it might have with EU universities (which as 
mentioned is a gateway to participation), and if their institution may already receive support 
from an Erasmus program. In addition to ICM the presentation also covered topics related to 
Jean Monnet and Erasmus Mundus, similar to what was discussed above.  
Another effort to promote Erasmus opportunities to a U.S. audience occurred at the 2017 
EducationUSA Europe/Eurasia (EUR) Regional Forum, which occurs every 3 years. During that 
conference a representative from the Spanish Service for the Internationalization of Education 
(SEPIE) provided an overview quite similar to the webinar that was offered by the Delegation. 
SEPIE is the entity in Spain that’s charged with the overall administration of Erasmus in that 
country, and the fact that it’s conducting outreach to an American audience is a demonstration 
that the U.S. is a priority country for the program to engage with. As a member of an EU 
country’s ministry of education the SEPIE representative is an integral member of the overall 
Erasmus administrative ecosystem which includes Program Officers at the European 
Commission in Brussels, staff at HEIs across the region including those that have institutional 
partnerships with U.S. HEIs, and others. This stakeholder network is integral to ensure the 
programs’ engagement and administration.    
This overview of Erasmus Programs, how U.S. entities can participate in them and 
outreach efforts conducted by various entities across the EU brings to light a variety of findings 
including, perhaps most importantly, that Erasmus does provide meaningful support directly to 
U.S. institutions, students and scholars. Additionally, the award rate to the U.S. is quite high 
within the parameters of the respective program budgets, the overall number of applications for 




the various programs are increasing thus indicating that the aforementioned outreach efforts have 
been successful, and overall funding for Erasmus will change in the near future (per the new 
budget that will take effect in 2021) thus effecting the degree of U.S. participation in the 
respective programs. In order to develop new and innovate existing opportunities for 
international education engagement between the EU and U.S. including with Erasmus programs, 
however, it’s essential to now have an understanding of the international education programs that 
are supported on the U.S.-side by its federal government. 
Support from the U.S. Federal Government for International Education 
This is a good point to remember that one of Erasmus’ main objectives is inward-facing; 
to foster a culture so that citizens of the European community increasingly consider themselves 
as “European” significantly or primarily rather than their respective national identity. That’s why 
the overwhelming majority of the programs’ funds are applied to foster European student 
mobility within Europe. U.S. federal government-supported international education programs, 
however, are significantly more outward-facing in that they provide support for U.S. and foreign 
students, scholars and higher education administrators to achieve academic, research or 
professional development experiences outside their respective countries and to foster 
relationships between citizens of the U.S. and other countries. Through those experiences 
program participants develop skills necessary to address a myriad of academic, economic, and 
national security challenges. Even though its motivations are different than the EU, the U.S. has 
an established record of significant and durable support for international education programming 
which can serve as a foundation from which to advance collaboration with Erasmus. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive official publication about U.S. government funding for 
international education is intitled “U.S. Government Resources Information Guide – Higher 




Education Community” (2019). This four-page document lists international education programs 
supported by five federal government entities: The U.S. Departments of Commerce, Education, 
Homeland Security, National Science Foundation, and State. Programs from those departments 
facilitate domestic and overseas student mobility for international education experiences, the 
promotion of “U.S. goods” (including U.S. HEIs that international students pay to attend), and 
immigration services in the form of student visas. Also included in the document is the following 
guidance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; “Universities and researchers should protect 
their intellectual property and be cognizant that there are dishonest actors and organizations that 
can take advantage of the environment of sharing on U.S. campuses of higher education” (p. 2). 
This excerpt demonstrates how the USG employs a comprehensive interpretation of “national 
security”, one that extends beyond the traditional hard power (military) interface between nations 
to knowledge transfer. 
USG programs that have had the most interface with the EU and Erasmus are the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Title VI National Resource Center (NRC) Program, its Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education’s (FIPSE) “Atlantis” program (discontinued in 2008), 
and the Department State’s Fulbright-Schuman program. The long-standing NRC program 
currently funds seven centers that are supported to teach the history, culture and languages of 
“Western Europe/Europe” and 10 for “Russia/East Europe/Eurasia” (National Resource Centers 
Program, 2019). Those programs run on four-year funding cycles, with the current one lasting 
from the U.S. Federal Government Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 until 2021. In total the funding for 
those 17 centers for FY 2018 was $4,049,145, and most of those centers are located at large 
public or private comprehensive research HEIs. Many of the Erasmus “Jean Monnet Chairs” are 
located in the same academic departments that also receive NRC funding, and there is significant 




similarity between the objectives and allowable activities of the two programs. Specifically, as 
explained in the NRC program 2018 application: 
Grants awarded under the NRC Program enable institutions of higher education (IHEs) or 
consortia of IHEs to establish, strengthen, or operate comprehensive or undergraduate 
centers that will be national resources for modern foreign language training in 
combination with research and training in area studies, international studies, or the 
international aspects of professional studies. (Federal Register, 2018, p. 24297) 
The closest approximation to the NRC program offered by the Erasmus programs are the “Jean 
Monnet Centres of Excellence, Chairs, and Modules” which is intended to: 
…deepen teaching in European integration studies embodied in an official curriculum of 
a higher education institution, as well as to conduct, monitor and supervise research on 
EU content, also for other educational levels such as teacher training and compulsory 
education. They also intend to provide in-depth teaching on European integration matters 
for future professionals in fields which are in increasing demand on the labour market, 
and at the same time aim at encouraging, advising and mentoring the young generation of 
teachers and researchers in European integration subject areas. (Erasmus+ Programme 
Guide, n.d., Sec. 4) 
The allowable activities for the Jean Monnet Chairs are to “deepen teaching in EU studies in an 
official curriculum of a higher education institution; provide in-depth teaching on EU matters for 
future professionals in fields which are in increasing demand on the labour market” (Jean 
Monnet - Chair, n.d.). While the objectives and allowable activities of NRC and Jean Monnet do 
not directly align, there is enough similarity to provide significant program activity cross-
pollination in collaboration with those U.S. HEIs that have demonstrated language and area 




studies capacity so that HEIs are able to continue to offer European-related area and language 
studies. Another program to connect the EU and U.S. educational systems was previously 
supported, the Atlantis Program, and its story should be considered before new collaboration 
efforts are attempted.     
Atlantis  
For more than ten years the U.S. Department of Education’s “Fund for the Improvement 
of Postsecondary Education” (FIPSE) and the European Commission’s “Education, Audiovisual 
and Culture Executive Agency” jointly administered the “EU-U.S. Atlantis Programme” 
(Atlantis). It was discontinued in 2011 after the end of a five-year funding cycle. The program 
consisted of HEIs from different member states in the EU and U.S. which received support to 
develop and administer joint or dual undergraduate degrees in a “wide range of academic and 
professional disciplines for four years.” Atlantis was one of FIPSE's three internationally-
oriented programs, and were a: 
…collaboration among the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Postsecondary 
Education and foreign government agencies to fund and coordinate federal education 
grant programs. For the period 1995-2004, the EU-U.S. Program, North American 
Program, and U.S.-Brazil Program have involved over 1,400 institutions in Europe, North 
America, and Brazil. Through funding from FIPSE and its foreign government 
counterparts, these programs, from 2001-2004, helped over 3,500 students study in their 
disciplines and professions in another country, often in a foreign language. Over 9,000 
non-mobile students have been impacted by the changes to the curricula at their home 
institutions that have come about through collaboration among the participating 




institutions. (Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education – Overview of the 
International Initiatives, n.d., para. 5) 
These programs represented an important tool to help higher education institutions advance their 
internationalization strategies and connect the HEIs of the participating countries. This was 
achieved by not only providing support to students to study abroad, but also to embed global 
themes in curriculum which impacted the aforementioned 9,000 “non mobile” students who 
didn’t study abroad but whose coursework was “internationalized”. As explained by the U.S. 
Department of Education (n.d.), allowable activities for the program included: multilateral, 
multi-institutional collaboration; student mobility; mutual recognition of credits and study 
activities; development of shared and/or common curricula; acquisition of host country 
languages; development of apprenticeships and other work activities; and faculty and staff 
cooperation and exchange.  
The U.S. Department of Education identified the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 
between the U.S. and the European Commission as the inception event for the Atlantis program 
and it grew from there. Specifically: 
From 1995 to 2004, the United States and the European Commission funded 107 
consortia involving over 725 U.S. and EC institutions. In December 2000, the United 
States and the European Union signed a five-year agreement to renew the Cooperation 
Program in Higher Education and Vocational Education and Training. A new multi-year 
agreement was negotiated for the EU-U.S. Program that entered in force in 2006. (Fund 
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education - Overview of the International 
Initiatives, n.d., para. 7) 




The overview goes on to explain that funded projects lasted for several year and allowed for a 
wide range of activities including: “multilateral, multi-institutional collaboration; student 
mobility; mutual recognition of credits and study activities”, and other activities (Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education - Overview of the International Initiatives, n.d., para. 
6). The program’s history continued to 2007 when the European Commission and US authorities 
jointly launched 14 new transatlantic cooperation projects. The agreement did not reach its 
agreed upon duration, however, and the program was cancelled a short time later. It is reasonable 
to assume that the decision to end the program was due, in part, to the financial crisis of 2008 
and budget cuts on the U.S.-side. Although the Atlantis Program has not been relaunched the 
Fulbright Schuman Program continues to this day and provides opportunities for Americans and 
Europeans “to study and conduct research on the transatlantic relationship. The program funds 
graduate and post-graduate study, research, and lecture proposals in the field of US-EU relations, 
EU policy, or EU institutions for interested American and EU citizens” (About the Fulbright 
Schuman Program, n.d.). A significant difference between Schuman and Atlantis, therefore, is 
that Schuman provides support to students to study at HEIs in the U.S. or EU in existing 
programs while the Atlantis provided a means for those HEIs to develop and administer 
programs collaboratively with students ultimately dividing their time between them during the 
course of the respective academic program.   
Even with the discontinuation of the Atlantis Program it is still a helpful template for 
possible future collaborations to connect the U.S. and EU higher education systems. An example 
of a successful project supported by the Atlantis Program was one awarded to the University of 
Montana which helped to: 




…develop and implement an innovative dual B.Sc. degree programme in Geosciences 
that focuses on field-based learning in an international setting, while also including 
substantial training in allied sciences, language, and culture.  The programme will be 
centered on the different natural geosciences laboratories already used by each partner 
and will take advantage of complimentary in-house research facilities operated by each. 
This programme builds on the strength of existing institutional relationships, geosciences 
curriculum, and complementary research facilities among all three consortium partners. 
The project is expected to mobilize 48 students (24 from each side) and 24 faculty. 
(Europa.eu, 2007, para. 11) 
For institutions like the University of Montana, which generally do not have extensive brand 
recognition outside its state or resources to establish and run time and resource-intensive projects 
such as the one supported by the Atlantis, the support it received was particularly impactful.   
The Erasmus+ Program that shares many of Atlantis’ characteristics is the “Erasmus 
Mundus Joint Masters Degrees” (EMJMDs) program. “From 2014 to 2017, 63 institutions from 
North America (U.S. and Canada) were involved in 41 of the 108 selected EMJMDs”, and 48 of 
those institutions were in the U.S. (European Commission, 2018, p.2). The opportunity to receive 
support for collaborations to achieve outcomes like joint masters degree programs offered by 
U.S. and EU HEIs do still exist, therefore, but currently they’re supported almost exclusively by 
the EU. 
The Arguments for International Education on both sides of the Atlantic 
By now it should be clear that the EU and U.S. have their own primary motivations when 
it comes to support for international education to address (and perhaps even solve) large social 
and diplomatic issues. There are a variety of other measurable outcomes that come from support 




of the programs, however, and these include things like improved employment rates and modern 
skills development as noted in The Erasmus Impact Study (Erasmus+ webinar, n.d.). 
Specifically; “Unemployment rates among Erasmus participants are 23% lower 5 years after 
graduation compared to those who did not go abroad. Two-thirds of employers think that 
international experience is a key asset for job candidates and leads to greater professional 
responsibility.” The Study also found that; “92% of employers are looking for transversal skills 
such as curiosity, problem-solving skills, tolerance and confidence; 64% of employers say 
graduates with an international background are given greater professional responsibility; and 
64% of employers think international experience is important for recruitment (compared to 37% 
in 2006).” These findings strengthen the argument to support Erasmus as the outcomes extend 
beyond only long-term social goals.  
The European Commission administers the “EuroBarometer” report which consists of 
approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews per (EU) country on a variety of topics including 
“Media pluralism and democracy”, “Attitudes of Europeans towards Animal Welfare”, and other 
topics. As reported by the Independent about one of the survey’s findings (Stone, 2017); “A 
record number of people in EU countries now personally feel like they are citizens of the 
European Union (68% of EU citizens polled).” It should be noted that this survey came 
approximately one year after the BREXIT vote which may have prompted respondents to 
reexamine and affirm their European identity, and by the time of that poll Erasmus programs had 
been operation for approximately 30 years and hundreds of thousands of Europeans had 
participated in its programs mixing with other students from across the continent (thus 
influencing them to identify as European). Whatever the reasons for this heightened sense of 
European identity, its findings speak to the comments of Sassatelli (2002) and others who wrote 




about its gradual adoption and the strategies and challenges along that road. Since that 2017 
survey events across the region have unfolded at a rapid pace with particularly significant 
changes in Germany and France (which have long served as the EU’s economic and political 
center): Chancellor Merkel will soon step-down after more than 15 years in power, Marine Le 
Pen and other “Eurosceptics” in France (and other countries) gained more seats in the European 
parliament in the 2019 election, and the region’s economy remains stagnant compared to other 
countries and regions around the world. It remains to be seen, therefore, if the political center 
that produced this increasingly European-identifying generation will hold or if other options, like 
nationalism, will gain in popularity. 
Meanwhile in the U.S., a 2011 survey conducted by NAFSA (Association of 
International Educators) to likely voters found that a strong majority of respondents (57%) say 
study abroad is very essential to the educational experience. 65% of Americans surveyed believe 
that if our young people do not learn foreign languages then they will be at a competitive 
disadvantage in their careers. And 73% believe that America’s higher education institutions must 
do a better job of teaching students about the world if they are to be prepared to compete in the 
global economy. Leon Pannetta, a former Congressman and Secretary of Defense, added in 
2011; “It is vital to our economic interests. It is vital to our diplomacy. It is vital to our national 
security to use the language of the people that we engage throughout the world” (Abdul-Alim, 
2010). The American public and political leaders, therefore, seem to endorse meaningful support 
for international education programs. 
But what are the outcomes of these efforts on the soft power public diplomacy front, 
specifically global perceptions of the U.S.? According to a Pew Research study (Wike, et al, 
2018) that was conducted after the first two years of the Trump administration, favorability had 




generally and quite dramatically fallen especially among traditional allies such as Germany and 
France and geographic neighbors (Canada and Mexico). For example, since the end of the 
Obama administration there has been an 11% decline of the opinion of the U.S. in the United 
Kingdom, 31% in the Netherlands, 26% in Canada, and 34% in Mexico. Countries where 
favorability has increased include Israel (+2%) and Russia (+11%). Considering that funding for 
international education programs offered by the federal government has remained roughly steady 
over the past couple years, it can be concluded that these declines aren’t due to rates of student, 
scholar or administrator mobility to the U.S. Rather, the biggest change during this period has 
been political in the form of policies (e.g. visa regulations) and rhetoric. 
Is there a connection between the respective pressures that the EU and U.S. face - 
challenges against EU cohesion and waning global perceptions of the U.S.? Li (2018) may have 
partially addressed this by stating; “…the hubris of soft power led to the illusion that soft power 
could somehow exist on its own. But even [Nye] never said that. In reality, soft power is and 
always will be an extension of hard power.” This observation calls into question if the U.S. and 
EU’s international education programs can achieve their respective objectives, however 
different, if they’re not also interfacing with or via an instrument of hard power. Li continues: 
The European project, perhaps even more so, was built on a false understanding of soft 
power. For many decades, Europe was essentially a free rider in the soft power game; the 
United States guaranteed its security, and its economic well-being was reliant on the 
U.S.-led global economic order. With the United States now less interested in providing 
either—and focusing more on hard power—Europe is facing real challenges. (Li, 2018, 
para. 15)   




Chief among these challenges, to both the U.S. and Europe, is China; a nation which embraces a 
starkly different set of political values compared to Western liberal democracies. Those values 
are quickly congealing into a distinct political ethos which go by a variety of names including “a 
community of shared destiny.” Lee explains within in that “community”: 
…nations are allowed their own development paths while working to increase 
interconnectedness. In the policy arena, such soft power mostly takes the form of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, which leverages China’s massive capital and capacity to drive 
infrastructure-led development in other countries to spur economic growth that would 
ultimately benefit China itself. It is a new potential soft power proposition: “You don’t 
have to want to be like us, you don’t have to want what we want; you can participate in a 
new form of globalization while retaining your own culture, ideology, and institutions.” 
(Li, 2018, para. 27)   
What China is really doing here is to encourage nations around the world, including those in 
Europe, to focus on economic development primarily and set aside the processes and institutions 
necessary to develop and sustain a liberal democracy. In other words, it’s saying ‘enough of this 
patronizing American and EU meddling in your internal political affairs, we (China) are here to 
help with pragmatic concerns that have an immediate impact in peoples’ lives.’ It remains to be 
seen if the U.S. and EU will coordinate their efforts in a meaningful enough way to counter 
China’s growing influence or continue their narrow emphasis on civil society reform and 
democratization which is increasingly seen ideological relics from the post-Cold War era.  
That being said, if the EU does not robustly defend, develop and, yes, demand democratic 
institutions in its member nations then it will, quite simply, lose its moral justification to exist. At 
the same time, if the U.S. does not double-down on its commitment to the institutions that 




connect both sides of the Atlantic - the EU and NATO specifically - then it will have squandered 
the opportunity to support and strengthen ties with its most important military, political and 
economic allies. A vacuum would be created by this type of neglect, and antagonistic powers 
would rush in even more quickly and inexorably than they already have. To counter this, the U.S. 
and EU should continue support for their respective international education schemes and tie them 
even more closely together, somehow incorporate NATO into these efforts as the hard power 
backstop (per Li’s advice that soft power can’t stand alone), and make significant tangible 
investments like China’s one-belt-one-road initiative.  
If things weren’t dynamic enough already, Rahul Choudaha (n.d.) addressed other 
changes in the field of international education by commenting on the current status of 
international student mobility around the world (which is international education’s most 
important metric). In his article “Driving Enrollment Growth in the Third Wave of International 
Students” he posits that since 2001 there have three distinct “waves” of international student 
mobility linked to certain economic and geopolitical events. Specifically:  
Table 2  
The Three Waves of International Student Mobility: 
Wave Dates Event Outcome 













‘Wave three’, according to Choudaha, is shaped by: 
…the uncertainties triggered by the new political order in the U.S., particularly the anti-
immigrant rhetoric and policies that have raised barriers to attracting international 
students. Also, increasing global competition and rising tuition costs are making it more 




difficult for higher education institutions to attract global learners. For example, a recent 
report by Studyportals, “Megatrends Shaping the Future of Global Higher Education,” 
identified the dramatic increase in the number of English-taught programs in Continental 
Europe and Asia at lower tuition cost as a challenge to high-cost destinations like the 
U.S. and the U.K. (Choudaha, n.d., para. 8)  
These conditions in addition to the aforementioned ascendency of China, represent significant 
challenges for the U.S. to maintain its status as the leader in international education, and are also 
some of the pressures pulling the U.S. and EU apart.  
 It’s also important to note that even though the U.S.’s market share of internationally 
mobile students is decreasing the number overall continues to rise; according to “Project Atlas” 
(Institute of International Education, n.d.) in 2018 over five million students studied abroad with 
the U.S. receiving just over one million of them, and over the past several years its market share 
of these internationally mobile students has fallen from 28% to 24%. Consequently, as its appeal 
to international students declines the power of the U.S.’s overall public diplomacy efforts will 
also weaken. 
 None of this is to assume a fait accompli: that the EU and U.S.’s international education 
engagement are doomed to weaken and whither, that entities in the EU will tighten their embrace 
of illiberal political forces, or that the U.S.’s market share of international students will continue 
to decline and xenophobic attitudes rise. Rather, these articulated challenges and pressures 
should serve as a diagnostic tool to identify pressures on the trans-Atlantic partnership generally 
and its international education collaboration specifically so that appropriate responses can be 
employed. 
 





Has peak educational internationalization been reached? Have programs like Erasmus 
and those offered by the USG been effective to address their stated social objectives? 
Internationalization at the more grassroots institutional level has certainly received significant 
airtime and investment but, as Karin Fischer (2019) argues, international education’s golden age 
may have “lost its sheen.” In her argument Fischer includes comments by Philip G. Altbach, the 
founding director of the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College, who said 
that, “The era of internationalization might be over, or on life support.” The reasons for this are 
multifaceted, some of which have been discussed, but at its core seem to be related to the jarring 
impact of economic globalization that’s led to a sense of alienation felt by wide swaths of the 
population. Global mobility and collaboration, things that international education advocates 
trumpet as good or at least inevitable, are exactly the type of forces that wide swaths of the 
newly economically disenfranchised diagnose as the reasons and not the solutions to their 
problems. As Madeleine Green, a senior fellow at the International Association of Universities, 
observed, “Of course, if you don’t want to live in a diverse world, that’s not a very compelling 
argument [to promote international education]” (Fischer, 2019). These observations seem to be 
supported by a report by the Association of International Education Administrators (AIEA) that’s 
reported a “drop-off in the share of institutions reporting that internationalization is a high 
priority in their strategic plans, from 60 percent, in 2011, to 47 in 2017” (Association of 
International Education Administrators, 2017). 
Although Fischer speaks from an American perspective, policy makers in Washington 
and Brussels should heed these warning as they depend on public support to sustain and advance 
their international education programs. Choudaha’s three waves of student mobility is another 




construct to keep in mind when considering all this, particularly the “third wave” (the impact of 
the new world order and slower international enrollment growth). The remedy for decreased 
student mobility could be more public support for students to study abroad such as what Erasmus 
is doing within Europe including its ambitious plans to scale-up in the programs’ next iteration 
(starting in 2021). The U.S. has meaningful international education student mobility programs, 
such as Fulbright, Gilman and the Critical Language Scholarships Programs, but to achieve 
broader-based public support and address economic and national security challenges they, like 
Erasmus, need to be scaled-up.   
A significant portion of student mobility between the U.S. and Europe is achieved via 
institutional partnerships and their corresponding student exchange agreements, dual and joint 
degree programs, faculty-led study abroad programs, and post-doctoral research opportunities. 
These partnerships are contingent upon the elements of a healthy relationship: trust, 
communication, and equity. In her article “Practical Considerations for International 
Partnerships” Suzanne Alexander (2013) presents a series of tips for partnerships to be effective, 
including: the partnerships must provide multiple benefits (diversified), are for the long term, 
and need a clear focus from the beginning. Her last tip, that partnerships work best when they are 
“like us”, deserves a deeper analysis in the context of collaboration between the U.S. and EU’s 
international education programs. Specifically, she recommends that prospective partners “take 
some time to understand what each partner wants from the partnership” which is important here 
considering Erasmus’ inward focus to address European identity, and the U.S. programs’ more 
outward public diplomacy-facing stance. This does not mean collaboration between the programs 
can’t be achieved, rather it’s best to have that understanding from the beginning so each entity 
can better understand how to help their partner achieve their respective objective(s). 




The type of guidance Ms. Alexander provides is mostly for HEIs when they enter 
partnerships with one another so a similar conceptual framework is needed for international 
education partnerships at the governmental-level. With this in mind, the following are 
considerations that large government programs like Erasmus and the USG’s international 
education should keep in mind when determining how to best engage with one another: 
(1) Understand the larger social issues that the investments in international education programs 
are trying to address. As explained, in the case of the EU it’s mostly to achieve a great sense 
of European identity and for the U.S. they’re primarily soft power public diplomacy tools. 
(2) Map program offerings to determine similarities, differences, opportunities for collaboration 
and best practices. For the EU and the U.S. this can be achieved by a side-by-side 
comparison of the programmatic offerings especially those from the U.S. Departments of 
State and Education, and the Erasmus programs. In the case of the Department of 
Education’s National Resource Centers and Erasmus’ Jean Monnet, for example, their 
similarities can be leveraged to increase the number of constituents (learners) who are served. 
(3) Provide opportunities for students and institutions to participate in one another’s programs.  
Erasmus’ Credit Mobility Program supplemental application (to allow for U.S. HEIs to 
participate) is a good example of this; it’s not an overly onerous instrument and achieves 
meaningful mobility in both directions. 
(4) Ensure that investments are durable. This is especially important as outcomes from 
programmatic and institutional collaborations are achieved several years down the road if not 
longer. The abrupt end to the Atlantis Program serves as a cautionary tale here as it was an 
initiative that was achieving positive outcomes but, unfortunately, discontinued in an abrupt 




manner that may have impacted the overall relationship (between Erasmus and the 
Department of Education).   
(5) Align soft power and hard power objectives. In the case of the trans-Atlantic partnership this 
means articulating how NATO, Erasmus and USG international education programs can 
work towards similar outcomes, and to provide mechanisms to allow them to more closely 
collaborate. This could be accomplished by those entities contributing to an area of common 
priority, such as cyber security, disinformation or media literacy; after the threat is articulated 
NATO would be designated as the front-line force providing immediate and ongoing 
protection, and Erasmus and USG international education programs implement 
corresponding technical training programs.  
(6) Increase student participation. Support to staff and administrators to build capacity is 
important, but without significant student participation in international education programs, 
especially by populations who historically have not participated in them, broad-based public 
support for their continuation will wane. Support is achieved by the impressive scale of 
students who participate in Erasmus Programs each year and the U.S.’s Generation Abroad 
initiative and Gilman Program, but other actions, such as the languishing Simon Study 
Abroad Act in the U.S., also need to be activated. If international education programs serve 
those who would’ve had an international education (study abroad) experience regardless if 
they existed or not, then there isn’t a strong argument why they should receive public 
support. 
(7) Articulate the importance of international education with partners across multiple sectors. 
Educators have long advocated for international education, but other stakeholders who also 
recognize its value have not been brought into the conversation enough. Leon Panetta’s 




comments and the findings of the Erasmus Impact Study are examples of the additional types 
of voices that can be brought into this conversation and speak to international education’s 
role to ensure economic competitiveness and national security. 
The public institutions that were born after World War Two, developed during the Cold War, 
and stood to ensure general peace and prosperity in Europe, the U.S. and for much of the world 
over the past 70 years are under threat: NATO is the most successful military alliance in the 
history of the world but its relevance is now questioned. The European Union lifted Europe from 
the ashes of World War Two, helped bring it back together after the Cold War and fostered a 
sense of shared cultural identity but it’s increasingly seen as out-of-touch, intrusive and 
inefficient. Meanwhile across the Atlantic, the United States is acting in an erratic and 
isolationist manner eerily similar to how it behaved after World War One when its presence on 
the world stage was perhaps most needed. As the EU and U.S. struggle to find their footing in 
this new world, illiberal and authoritarian powers are waiting in the wings ready and eager to fill 
the void. It’s no exaggeration to say that the global geopolitical paradigm is resting on a knife’s 
edge and the actions over the next several years will determine if democratic or authoritarian 
political systems gain the upper hand. To ensure that liberal democracy keeps its position of 
dominance, two of its largest practitioners, the U.S. and EU, must work even more closely 
together. Effective ways to do that are to expand commitment to their respective international 
education schemes, establish more programs to stich them together and work closely with 
NATO. The pieces are in place to achieve a new level of transatlantic international education 
collaboration which, if wholeheartedly committed to, will also help the EU and U.S. achieve 
their respective social and public diplomacy objectives. 
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